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Abstract
This paper examines whether the voter with the median incomeis d cisive in
local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while
we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specifi-
cation. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local
educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67to 55 percent, respec-
tively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when
deciding how to vote on voting rules, but the empirical evidence strongly suggests
that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules.
This finding is consistent with high income voters with weak demand for public
educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on
education.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: H4, H7, I2
Keywords: Median Voter Hypothesis, Voting, Referenda, Education Spend-
ing
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1.   Introduction 
 The median voter model has a long theoretical and empirical history within public economics.  
Since the pioneering work of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), which established the conditions under 
which the median voter is also the voter with the median income, hundreds of studies have used th
median voter framework to estimate demands for publicly provided goods and services.  The enduring 
popularity of the median voter model stems both from its simplicity and its analytic tractability.  As noted 
by Inman (1978), if governments act “as if” to maximize the preferences of the median income voter, the 
median voter hypothesis provides “a powerful starting point for predictive and normative analysis of 
government behavior.”   
Despite the wide spread popularity of the median voter model, the key assumption that the
median voter is also the voter with the median income has been repeatedly challenged. 1   For example, 
Epple and Romano (1996a) demonstrate that when there are private alternatives to public services (e.g. 
private schools), an equilibrium exists where the median income voter is not pivotal.  Instead, the pivotal 
voter has an income that lies below the median. They describe this finding as “Ends against the Middle” 
where high income voters join the poor to oppose spending on education.  Similarly, Fletcher and Knny 
(2008) develop a model in which the elderly, who typically have little demand for local educational 
services, vote with the poor in support of lower levels of education spending.  They demonstrate tha   
larger share of elderly results in a median voter who is further down a community’s i come distribution.   
In light of these challenges, numerous studies have attempted to test whether the voter with the 
median income is empirically relevant for describing local public service provision.  Pommerehne and 
Frey (1976), Pommerehne (1978), Inman (1978), Deno and Mehay (1987), Turnbull and Djoundourian 
(1994) and Turnbull and Mitias (1998) evaluate the performance of the median voter model by examining 
whether the use of median income in local public service demand regressions outperforms other 
specifications (such as replacing median income with mean income).  The results of tho e studies 
generally support the hypothesis that the median income voter is decisive.2  On the other hand, Aronsson 
and Magnus (1996) test the predictive power of a model where the median income voter is assumed to be 
decisive against a more general statistical alternative.  Their results lead them to reject the hypothesis that 
the voter with the median income is decisive.  Similarly, based on county-level data from 1990 and 2000, 
Fletcher and Kenny find evidence that the median voter is not the voter with the median income.  Rather, 
                                                
1 See Holcombe (1989) for a review of the criticisms and concerns surrounding the median voter model, and see 
Wildasin (1986) for an extended discussion of the assumptions required for the median voter model to be applied 
empirically. 
2 Using a revealed preference approach, Turnbull and Chang (1998) also find that local governments act “ s if” to 
maximize the utility of the median income voter. 
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they find that as the share of elderly in a community increases, the voter with the pivotal income is 
located farther down the community’s income distribution. 
While the empirical studies listed above employ different datasets and different methodologies, a 
common feature of nearly all prior studies that test the median voter hypothesis is that they rely on 
aggregate cross-sectional data to identify the relationship between public service outcomes and a 
community’s median income.  These studies are likely biased because communities differ across a variety 
of dimensions including unobserved preferences for public services, the cost of providing publc services, 
etc; and these differences are likely correlated with the distribution of incme in each community.  
Furthermore, prior studies have typically attempted to test the median voter hypothesis using the same 
framework that is used to estimate demands for publicly provided goods; namely, by examining the 
relationship between community expenditures and some measure of community income.  Consequently, 
those studies suffer from the same fundamental problem of measuring actual service d mands that 
plagues most studies that utilize the median voter model to estimate demands for publicly rovided 
goods.   
 In this paper, we propose an entirely new approach for testing the median voter hypothesis.  We 
examine vote returns from a unique pair of California referenda that proposed changing the rules under 
which public spending decisions are determined.  Specifically, the first referendum, which failed, 
proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 
percent, and the second referendum, which was held only eight months later and passed, proposed 
lowering the vote requirement from 67 to 55 percent.  Thus, assuming demand is monotonically 
increasing in income, the first referenda would have changed the identity of the decisive voter from the 
voter in the 33rd percentile of the income distribution to the 50th percentile while the second referenda 
would have changed the identity of the decisive voter from the voter in the 33rd percentile to the voter in 
the 45th percentile.  Using the results from these two referenda, we test whether people vote “as if” future 
spending decisions will be based upon the preferences of the newly proposed decisive voter by examining 
whether the change in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes cast in the two elections can be explained by the implied 
change in the newly proposed decisive voter’s income, i.e. the difference between the 50th and 45th 
percentile income in a jurisdiction. We also test an additional implication of referenda voting models, 
namely that the influence of the decisive voter’s preferences on vote outcomes declines with jurisdiction 
heterogeneity (Romer, Rosenthal and Munley 1992; Rothstein 1994). 
Unlike previous tests of the median voter hypothesis, where public service spending is used to 
infer a relationship between the median voter’s preferences and outcomes of the political rocess, our test 
infers that a median voter relationship holds because voters act as if the relationship holds when they cast 
their ballots to determine voting rules for choosing the level of public services provided.  Consequently, 
 3
our test avoids the fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by vot rs within a 
jurisdiction which may be poorly proxied by the measures used in previous studies, such as expenditures 
per capita.  Furthermore, by regressing changes in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between the referendums on 
changes in the income associated with the decisive voter in each district, we are able to difference out 
school district unobservables that are likely correlated with the distribution of inc me within a district.  
 We find a strong relationship between the income distribution of a school district and the change 
in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between the two referenda.  This relationship, however, appears to arise from 
the influence of the income difference between 40th and 35th percentile on voting rather than the 50th to 
45th percentile.  Specifically, while the income difference between the 50th to 45th percentile can explain 
changes in voting between the two referenda, when we run a “horse race” between the changes in income 
between the 50th to 45th percentile and the 40th and 35th percentile, the difference between lower 
percentiles entirely captures the systematic relationship between the income distribution and voting.3   
This finding is consistent with earlier work by Epple and Romano (1996a) and Fletcher and Kenny (2008) 
which suggests that the income of the decisive voter will be below the median income when high income 
voters with low demand for education services vote with the poor in support of low levels of public 
services.  Furthermore, when we split our sample based on the fraction of individuals in a district that are 
high income and yet are expected to have low demand for public education services (e.g. households 
without children, households with children in private school, and voters age 55 or older), the evidence 
points towards a lower income percentile decisive voter for districts with a greater fraction of high income 
households with low demand and a higher income percentile decisive voter for districts with a smaller 
fraction of high income households with low demand. 
Our findings based on a decisive voter at the 40th percentile of income for a majority voting rule 
are very robust.  Our estimates imply that the decrease in income between the 40th and 35th percentile in a 
school district led to somewhere between a 2.1 and 3.2 percentage point increase in the percent voting yes 
for the school districts in our sample.4  This compares to an actual increase in the percent voting yes of 
4.3 percentage points.  These findings persist across a series of specifications ontrolling for changes in 
turnout and political representation between the two referenda, differences between small and large 
school districts, demographic differences between school districts, as well as model extensions that allow 
demand to depend upon the tax price of educational spending.  The estimated relationship also persists for 
constant income elasticity models that allow for heterogeneity in the distribution of preferences across 
                                                
3 Note that the theory of referenda voting on which our empirical model is built holds as long as the decisive voter 
can be characterized by an income percentile.  This percentile need not be the 50th percentile. 
4 If we consider the 40th percentile as being decisive under a majority voting rule, a larger decline between the 40th 
and 35th percentile income implies a larger decline in the increase in education spending that voters can expect from 
moving the current vote share of two-thirds to the new requirement of 50 or 55.  Consequently, more vot rs are 
willing to support the second referendum because it implies a smaller increase in spending. 
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school districts.  Furthermore, we find that the relationship between the income of the jurisdiction’s 
decisive voter and the likelihood of supporting a referendum does not hold for two counterfactuals 
estimated by replacing school districts with alternative definitions of jurisdiction based on census tracts 
and state assembly districts.   
Finally, we also find evidence that the relationship between the decisive voter’s demand and 
support for voting rules is weaker in more heterogeneous districts; evidence that provides empirical 
support for the referenda voting models developed by Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and 
Rothstein (1994).  Empirical support for referenda models of this type is especially important given that 
these models predict less electoral support for spending initiatives in the presence of greater voter 
heterogeneity; a prediction that is consistent with empirical findings of Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 
(1999).  
 
2. Review of the Literature on the Median Voter Model 
 Over the last several decades hundreds of studies have used the median voter model to estimate 
demands for publicly provided goods and services.5  The vast majority of those studies use aggregate 
cross sectional data to identify a relationship between public service expenditure levels and a 
community’s median income.6   Consequently, these studies either implicitly or explicitly rely on the 
results of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) that show that, “subject to certain st ong assumptions, majority 
rule implies that one can treat an observation of expenditure levels in a given jurisdiction as a point on the 
demand curve of a citizen of that community with median income for the community” (Bergstrom 
Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1982, p. 1184).   
Despite (or possibly because of) the wide spread popularity of the median voter model, the 
assumptions required for the model to hold have been repeatedly questioned.  Preferences may ot be 
single peaked when voters have preferences over multiple issues (McKelvey 1976) or when private 
alternatives exist (Stiglitz 1972; Epple and Romano 1996a).  Politicians and bureaucrats may use their 
ability to set the political agenda in order to maximize their budget (Niskanen 1975; Romer and Rosenthal 
1979a, 1979b, 1982; Romer Rosenthal, and Munley 1992; Balsdon, Brunner, and Ruben 2003), or they 
may make decisions based on their party’s or their own personal ideology (Levitt 1996; Gerber and Lewis 
                                                
5 A review of older studies that use the median voter framework to estimate demand can be found in Inman (1979).  
A few of the more recent studies include, Rothstein (1992), Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Stevens and Mason (1996), 
and de Bartolome (1997) for school spending, Schwab and Zampelli (1987) for police, Duncombe (1991) for fire, 
Balsdon, Brunner and Rueben (2003) for local general obligation bond issues, and Husted and Kenny (1997) for 
expansion of the voting franchise.  
6 A smaller set of studies, including Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) and 
Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987), use individual-level survey data to estimate demand for publicly provided 
goods and services.  See Rubinfeld (1987) for a review of these types of studies. 
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(2004); Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004); Reed 2006; Washington 2008).7 Notably, Gerber and Lewis 
(2004) find that this tendancy to follow party ideology is much stronger in heterogeneous jurisdictions.  
Similarly, politicians may have an incentive to act strategically (and in ways that deviate from the 
preferences of the median voter) because voter turnout may be influenced by differential voter reactions 
to their past actions (Hasting, Kain, Staiger, and Weinstein 2007) or by the media (Gentzkow 2006; 
DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007).  Finally, voting may be driven by the anticipated capitalizat on of school 
quality into housing prices (Nechyba 2000; Brunner and Imazeki 2008; and Cellini, Ferrera and Rothstein 
2008). 
 Furthermore, the standard assumption that the median voter is also the voter with themedian 
income has been repeatedly questioned.  As noted previously, Epple and Romano (1996a, 1996b) 
demonstrate that when there exist private alternatives to public goods or when public goods can be 
supplemented with private purchases, an equilibrium exists where the pivotal voter has an income that lies 
below the median.  Similarly, Fletcher and Kenny (2008) demonstrate that when the elderly hav  low 
demands for public services, a coalition of the elderly and the poor leads to a pivotal voter that once again 
has an income that lies below the median.  Both of these papers describe situations where voters at the 
ends of the income distribution combine to oppose the preferences of voters in the middle of the income 
distribution.  In addition, most of the studies that estimate demand for local public goods have ignored the 
issue of Tiebout sorting, in which households choose communities based in part upon their demand for 
public services.8  As noted by Ross and Yinger (1999), with Tiebout sorting communities may contain 
both higher income households with weak preferences for public services and lower income households 
with strong preferences for public services.  Consequently, the median preference voter may not be the 
voter with the median income.9    
Finally, nearly all empirical studies that utilize the median voter framework suffer from the 
fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by voters.  The vast majority of studies 
use community-level expenditures to infer a relationship between the median voter’s preferences for 
publicly provided services and outcomes of the political process.  However, as noted by Bhrman and 
Craig (1987), “… people pay taxes based on the city-wide amount of purchased inputs, but base their 
demand and voting behavior on the perceived level of neighborhood service output” (Behrman and Craig, 
1987, p. 47).  To the extent that the services produced differ substantially across jurisdiction  given the 
same public inputs, public spending will provide a poor proxy for public service provision.  Furthermore, 
                                                
7 See Kalt and Zupan (1984), Goff and Grier (1993), and Bailey and Brady (1998) for earlier studies that document a 
link between jurisdiction heterogeneity and legislator’s voting behavior. 
8 See Goldstein and Pauly (1981) for a nice discussion of the implications of Tiebout sorting on estimated public 
service demand parameters. 
9 Epple and Sieg (1999) estimate a structural model that allows for preference heterogeneity and enables th m to 
estimate income and price elasticities in a model that explicitly identifies the median preference voter. 
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unobserved community characteristics that influence the cost of providing public service  are likely to be 
correlated with other community characteristics like median income.10  As a result, studies that fail to 
properly control for the costs associated with providing public services are likely to be biased.  That fact 
is highlighted by Schwab and Zampelli (1987) who find that studies of public service demand that fail o 
take into account the impact of community characteristics on the cost of public service provision can yield 
very misleading results.   
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
Prior to 2000, local school bond measures in California required a two-thirds supermajority to 
pass.  If voters approved a bond issue, the bonds were then repaid with local property tax increases that 
remained in effect until the bonds were fully repaid.  In 2000 Californians voted on two statewide 
initiatives designed to ease this supermajority vote requirement.  In March of 2000 Californians voted on 
Proposition 26, an initiative that would have reduced the vote requirement on school bond measures to  
simple majority.  The proposition garnered the support of only 47 percent of voters and thus failed.  In 
November of 2000 Californians voted on Proposition 39, an initiative that was nearly identical to 
Proposition 26 except it called for reducing the vote requirement on local school bond measures to 55%.  
This time California voters approved the measure with 53 percent of voters supporting Proposition 39.  
To motivate our empirical test of the median voter model, we begin by examining the 
implications of the median voter model for the behavior of voters in a referendum on voting rules.  
Specifically, we develop a simple voting model based on Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and 
Rothstein (1994) in order to illustrate the relationship between support for a change in required vote share 
and the income of the decisive voter.  Let *ijS denote the desired level of school spending of individual 
i located in school district j .  The individual votes in favor of a decrease in the vote share required to 
pass spending referenda to P if and only if PS , the spending level under the new vote share, is preferred 
to 0S , the spending level under the current, higher vote share requirement.   
 Following Rothstein (1994), we parameterize individual preferences for school spending using 
the desired spending level *ijS  so that an individual’s indirect utility function )|(
*
ijj SSV  is maximized 
when district spending level *ijj SS = .  We allow districts to vary in terms of resident’s preference for 
school spending by assuming that the distribution of preferences in district j is distributed around a 
district mean preference *jS  or 
                                                
10 See Ross and Yinger (1999) for a survey of studies that document cost heterogeneity across jurisdictions, as well 
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where δ  is between zero and one.  Finally, substituting equations (1) and (2) into the inequality above, we 
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PS to 0S .  If jυ  and ijµ  follow 
independent type 1 extreme value distributions, then the difference has a logistic distribution with a 
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where the variance of the distribution is 22
3
1 πβ  and equals the sum of the variances of jυ  and ijµ , 
2
νσ  
and 2µσ  respectively, assuming that the two disturbances are independent (Johnson, Kotz, and 
                                                
11 Specifically, we assume that indifference curves ar  convex over public service levels and property tax rates so 
that given a well-behaved community budget constraint n individual has a unique preferred level of public service 
and utility declines as the public service level is increased above or decreased below that preferred lev l, see Epple 
and Romano (1996a, 1996b) as well as many other earlier papers that impose such assumptions.   This implies that 
)|( *ijj SSV  is a concave function of jS see Rothstein (1994) and Balsdon and Brunner (2005). 
 8
Balakrishnan, 1995).  If we assume that 
β
 is constant across communities and without loss of generality 
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where c1, c2, and c3 are all non-negative as found by Rothstein (1994) and jε  represents district specific 
factors that influence voting independent of public service demand.12  Equation (5) suggests a simple 
differencing estimation strategy.  Specifically, if the first initiatve imposed a required vote share of 50% 
for spending referenda and the second initiative imposed a 55% vote share, the difference in the log-odds 
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where both the unique district mean preference for public service levels, the default level of public service 
provision, and any idiosyncratic, time invariant district attributes that influece voting drop out of the 
model.   
 The assumption that 
β
 is constant across communities, however, is quite strong given other 
assumptions in the model.  Specifically, once ijµ  is restricted to follow an independent type 1 extreme 
value distribution, 2µσ , the variance of ijµ , must be positively related to the difference between the 50th 
and 55th percentile demands since only an increase in the variance can create additional spread at the 
center of the distribution holding the form of the distribution fixed.  Therefore, the assumption that 
β
 is 
constant requires that 2νσ  falls by the exact same amount as any increase in 
2
µσ .  Further, there are 
reasons to believe that jυ  and ijµ  are correlated across communities and that 
2
νσ  might also depend 
upon factors that influence the heterogeneity of preferences.  The disturbance jυ  captures community 
specific errors describing the indifference point between the proposed and initial spending levels, PS  and 
0S , which obviously depends on *S .  Different values of PS  and 0S  fall in different regions of the 
                                                
12 Equation (5) involves aggregate vote shares.  The aggregation from equation (3), which is based on indiv dual 
preferences, is accomplished via the assumption of a  extreme value distribution for the unobservable ssociated 
with the distribution of individual preferences within a jurisdiction and for the unobservable associated with 
parameterizing Pjα , the preference level in a community that is indifferent between the referendum passing or 
failing.  This assumption leads to jurisdiction vote shares that depend upon the standard logistic disribution.  
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indirect utility function, with different curvature, and so while 0S  will be differenced out of demand 
equations and PS  will enter directly into our model, they may still influence the distribution of jυ .  
Naturally, PS  and 0S  depend upon the same unobservables that influence the distribution ofijµ , and 
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where jβ  describes the unique standard deviation of the preference distribution for community j. 
 As equation (7) reveals, preference heterogeneity, as measured by β , scales the influence that the 
decisive voter’s demand has on referenda vote outcomes.  Specifically, the influence of the decisive 
voter’s demand on the determination of voting rules is smaller in more heterogeneous districts ( .e. 
districts with a largerβ ).  This result mirrors the results of Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and 
Rothstein (1994), who demonstrated that, all else equal, greater preference heterogen ity within 
jurisdictions results in lower approval margins for local referenda, and is consistent with the empirical 
findings of Gerber and Lewis (2004).  In the present context, equation (7) suggests that differences in the 
desired level of spending of the 50th and 55th percentile voters should have a smaller impact on the change 
in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes in districts with significant preference heterogeneity and a greater impact in 
districts with relatively little preference heterogeneity.  
 Further, given that the decisive voter in the second referenda has lower income and lower demand 
for public services, the demand term in equation (7) always implies an increase in voting yes between the 
first and second referenda, and increases in preference heterogeneity unambiguously reduce the increase 
in support for the proposal between the two referenda.  This result is consistent with the conclusions of 
Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) in their analysis of referenda that directly establish the level of 
spending on public goods.  Specifically, they conclude that electoral support for spending increases is 
reduced in heterogeneous communities. 13  In our model, this result can be observed from equation (4) 
where the impact of support for a proposed level of public services PS  on the likelihood of voting yes is 




                                                
13 See Proposition 2 in Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992). 
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4. Empirical Methodology 
In order to operationalize equation (6), initially maintaining the assumption that β is constant 
across communities, we assume that for referendum k  the implied future level of public service is a 
function of the income percentile associated with the vote share required under the referendum.  For a 50 
percent vote share and assuming demand is monotonically increasing with income, the standard median 
voter assumption applies where the future level of public service is a function of the median income in the 
school district.   For a 55 percent vote share, which is the share associated with the second referendum, 
the future level of public service is a function of the district’s 45th percentile income.  Specifically, a 
higher vote share for passage decreases the level of public service that will be supported by voters and 
thus shifts the decisive income further down the distribution.  Assuming a linear form for public service 
demand yields  
 






100 )( ,       (8) 
 
where kP is the required vote share for referendum k , 
kP
jy
−100 or jky for short is the income at the 
decisive percentile, and yb is the parameter describing the responsiveness of demand to income.  
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where the yd  parameter is just the yb  parameter from equation (8) multiplied by the negative term 3c−
and the difference between 2d  and 1d  allows the mean of the district unobservable, jkε , to vary across 
referenda k.  The median or decisive voter model predicts that yd should be positive since public service 
demand increases with income.  Specifically, each referendum is assumed to be supported by all voters 
who prefer the new higher level of spending to current spending based on the two-thirds vote 
requirement.  A larger income difference between the 50th and 55th percentile voter (i.e. the 50th and 45th 
percentile income), implies a larger reduction in new education spending or a smaller increase in spending 
over current levels, which is then supported by more voters.  
The first difference specifications utilized in equations (9) eliminates unobserved differences 
across districts in the average preference for public services, political leaning, time invariant differences 
in turnout rates, as well as a host of other idiosyncratic differences that affect voting and additively enter 
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the estimation equation.  Consequently, the first difference specification elimi ates time invariant factors 
that influence voting patterns and might be correlated with the income distribution and thus bias a cross-
sectional aggregate test of the median or decisive voter model.  Nevertheless, our first difference 
specification does not address the concern that changes in the decisive voter’s income between referenda 
may be correlated with unobservables that affect the change in vote share between r ferenda.  In order to 
control for such factors, additional models of change in vote share are estimated including linear controls 
for voter turnout and other attributes intended to capture changes in the composition of voters between the 
two referenda, such as district size and fraction residents that are college educated. 
As discussed earlier, the median income may not be decisive under a majority rule, and 
accordingly we consider the income difference between other income percentiles.  Specifically, we run 
regressions that include the income difference between the 50th and 45th percentiles along with an 
additional income difference, such as the difference between the 45th and 40th or the 60th and 55th 
percentiles.  The winner of these so called “Horse Races” provides evidence concerning the income of the 
decisive voter under majority voting.14  
 
Heterogeneous Preference Distributions with Constant Elasticity Demand 
 By specifying public service demand to be a simple linear function of the decisive voter’s income 
we are able to derive an estimation equation that is linear in the parameters, which is attractive from an 
estimation standpoint because unobservables in voting are differenced away.  However, the linear model 
assumes that preference heterogeneity, as captured by β  in equation (7), is constant across communities.  
As noted previously this is a rather strong assumption given the other assumptions of the m del.  
Moreover, the common practice in the literature is to assume public service deman  is characterized by 
constant income elasticity which implies 
 
( )θii PjPj ybS −= 1002 ,         (10) 
 
where θ  is the income elasticity of public service demand.  Substituting equation (10) into equation (7) 
and rearranging yields 
 
                                                
14 It is important to note that the interpretation of estimated coefficients will change if this analysis implies that the 
decisive voter is not the median income voter for majority rule.  For example, if Epple and Romano’s (1996a) “Ends 
against the Middle” story holds, the change in voting requirements from 50 to 55 would likely shift both voters near 
the decisive income percentile and higher income vot rs with weak preferences for education towards supporting the 








































,  (11) 
 
where jZ is a vector containing variables that capture heterogeneity in preferences within school district j
and the 3d  parameter is the 2b  parameter from equation (10) multiplied by the negative term 3c− from 
equation (7).  As above, the income elasticity θ  is expected to be positive.  Note that equation (11) is 
nonlinear in the parameters.  Consequently, in the empirical work that follows, we use non-linear least 
squares to estimate the parameters of this model.  Furthermore, as with the linear mod l, we consider 
additional specifications that include a host of linear controls that explain changes in vote share.   
 
5. Data 
We obtained data on vote outcomes for Propositions 26 and 39 from the Statewide Database, 
maintained by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.  The 
database contains aggregate vote outcomes and voter registration information, for all statewide primary 
and general elections held in California since 1990.  The primary unit of analysis in the statewide 
database is the Census block.  We aggregated the block level vote tallies and voter registration 
information up to the school district level.   
In the empirical framework developed in Section 4, the difference in vote shares between 
Propositions 39 and 26 is a function of the difference between the 50th and 45th percentile income in a 
school district.  To construct estimates of the income percentiles, we used district-level data from the 
2000 Census on the distribution of household income.  Specifically, the 2000 Census contains 
information on household income grouped into 17 income categories.  We used this grouped income data 
and linear interpolation to estimate the 50th and 45th percentile level of income in each district.  Using 
similar methods, we develop measures of the income difference for other percentil s, such as the 
difference between the 40th and 35th or 60th and 55th income percentiles.  
We also include a number of additional variables in several of our empirical specifications.  The 
first variable is the difference in voter turnout between Propositions 26 and 39.  Following Coate, Conlin 
and Moro (2008) and Coate and Conlin (2004) among others, we define voter turnout as the fraction of 
eligible voters (i.e., voting age population) in each district that voted on Propositin 39 and Proposition 
26 respectively.  We include the difference in voter turnout to account for the potential impact changes in 
voter turnout may have on vote outcomes between the two elections.  The second variable is the 
difference in the fraction of registered Republicans between Propositions 26 and 39 and the thir variable 
is the difference in the fraction of registered Democrats between the two propositions.  We include these 
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two variables to control for systematic changes in the ideological composition of vters between 
elections. 
 In addition to the difference control variables described above, we also include several l el 
control variables in some of our empirical specifications.  The first set of variables are district size fixed 
effects.  Specifically, we sorted districts into four equally sized groups based on total population, and 
created three indicator variables that take the value of unity if a district  in he second, third or fourth 
quartile of district size respectively.  The second set of variables describe the demographic composition of 
a school district.  Specifically, we include controls for (1) the fraction of the population ge 25 or older 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher, (2) the fraction of homeowner, (3) the fraction of households that are 
White and non Hispanic, (4) the fraction of households with children, and (5) the fraction of the 
population age 65 or older.  These variables were selected to capture factors that have been found in 
earlier literature to influence voting and public spending decisions. 
To implement the specification given by equation (11), which allows the distribution of 
preferences to differ across districts, we also develop three variables designed to measure preference 
heterogeneity within districts.  As discussed in section 3, district preference h terogeneity, as captured 
byβ , is likely related to the distribution of income.  Consequently, we include a Gini index of income 
inequality.  Preference heterogeneity is also likely to be related to the distribut on of political ideology 
within a district and the degree of racial heterogeneity.  For example, Democrats may have stronger 
preferences for local public spending than Republicans.  Similarly, preferences for local public spending 
may vary systematically across racial/ethnic groups.  We measure preference heterogeneity in political 
ideology and race/ethnicity using Herfindahl indices.  Following Urquiola (2006), the racial heterogeneity 









21 , where rjR is racial group r’s share of the population in school 
district j .  Greater values of this index are associated withgreater racial heterogeneity.  Similarly, the 
political ideology index we employ is: )(1 22log jj
yideo
j preppdemI +−= , where jpdem  is the fraction of 
registered democrats in district j and jprep  is the fraction of registered republicans in district j .     
Finally, we use an approach similar to that used for the income percentiles to construct measures 
of the 50th and 45th percentile tax prices.  The 50th percentile tax price in district j  is ( ) 50jjj hGE ⋅ , 
where jE denotes the total enrollment in district j , jG denotes the total assessed value of property in 
district j  and 50jh denotes the 50
th percentile assessed value of owner-occupied homes in di trict j .  
Similarly, the 45th percentile tax price is, ( ) 45jjj hGE ⋅ where 45jh denotes the 45th percentile assessed 
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value of owner-occupied homes in district j .  District-level data on student enrollment in 2000 were 
obtained from the California Department of Education while data on the total assessed value of property 
in each school district in 2000 were obtained from the Coalition for Adequate School Housing, a 
California school advocacy organization.  Unfortunately, district-level data on the assessed value of 
owner-occupied homes in California is unavailable.  Consequently, we used data from the 2000 census on 
the distribution of house values to estimate the 50th and 45th percentile level of home values and used 
these home value percentiles as proxies for 50jh  and 
45
jh  when constructing our tax price variables. 
Our use of the market value of homes as a proxy for the assessed value of homes has 
ramifications for our empirical work.  Specifically, in California, home values are likely to vary 
dramatically from assessed values due to Proposition 13, which prohibits the reassessment of homes for 
property tax purposes except when the house is sold.   Thus, two homes with the same market value may 
have substantially different assessed values depending on when they were last sold.  Given this fact, our 
tax price variable most likely suffers from substanti l measurement error.  In order to address this 
concern, we develop a Gini index for the heterogeneity within each district in terms of households’ years 
in current residence.  If all owner-occupied households have lived in their homes for the same length 
time, the assessments will reflect the same market price level for all households, and estimated home 
values likely provide a fairly accurate measure of tax price. 
Our data have a number of limitations.  The first limitation concerns school districts with 
overlapping boundaries.  Specifically, California contains three types of school districts: unified districts, 
elementary districts and high school districts.  The boundaries of the latter two types of districts overlap:  
one high school district typically contains two or more elementary districts.  Thus, in non-unified districts 
there are really two decisive voters:  the decisive voter for the elementary school district and the decisive 
voter for the high school district into which the el mentary district feeds. Consequently, in non-unified 
districts it is unclear how one should measure the income of the proposed decisive voter.  To overcome 
that limitation, we restrict our sample to unified school districts.  The second limitation concerns mi sing 
data.  Data on the fraction of voters supporting Proposition 26 is unavailable for 17 of the 323 unified 
school districts operating in California in 1999-2000.15  We exclude these 17 districts from our analysis 
leaving a final sample of 306 unified school districts.   
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations over the sample of unified school districts for the 
variables used in the analysis.  For variables that enter our model as differences, the summary statistics 
are reported separately for Propositions 26 and 39 respectively.  As expected, the increase in the vot
                                                
15 15 of the 17 districts with missing vote data were located in the counties of Monterey, Humboldt and San Luis 
Obispo which did not report vote tallies to the Statewide Database for Proposition 26.  The remaining two districts 
are small rural districts that had substantial missing observations on voting for Proposition 26. 
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requirement from 50 to 55 percent is associated with a greater percentage of voters supporting the 
referendum, lower decisive voter income, and lower decisive voter tax share.  The change from a March 
election (Prop 26) to a November election (Prop 39) also increases turnout from 28 to 43 percent of 
eligible voters.   
 
{Insert Table 1 Here} 
 
6. Results  
Regression results for the change in vote share using the linear demand specification in equation 
(9) are presented in Table 2.  The first column presents the basic model that controls only for the change 
in the decisive voter’s income.  The second and thir  columns contain results from models that include 
controls for changes between the two elections in tur out and party affiliation among registered voters 
and those controls plus jurisdiction size fixed effects, while the fourth column contains results based on a 
model that includes the controls used in column three plus additional controls for district demographic 
attributes.  As expected, all four regressions imply a strong positive relationship between the change i  
the decisive voter’s income and the change in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between Propositions 39 and 
26.16   The estimated coefficients on the change in the decisive voter’s income range from 0.143 to 0.203 
and are all statistically significant at the five prcent level.  These point estimates suggest that a large 
fraction of the change in vote shares between the two propositions can be explained by the change in the 
decisive voter’s income.  Specifically, based on equation (9) and the sample of unified school districts, 
our model predicts that the implied change in the decisive voter’s income is consistent with a 2.3 
percentage point increase in the percent voting yes in model 1, and a 2.8, 1.7, and 2.5 percentage point
increase in the percent voting yes in models 2, 3, and 4 respectively.17  Given that the actual increase in 
percent voting yes was 4.3 percentage points, our mdel predicts that between 39% and 65% of the 
change in vote shares between the two propositions ca  be explained by the change in the decisive voter’s 
income.18  
{Insert Table 2 Here} 
 
                                                
16 We also divided the sample into three subsamples based on the size of the increase in turnout between the two 
referenda.  The estimated effects were similar in magnitude, and we could not reject the hypothesis that the effect of 
income was the same across these three subsamples.   
17 The predicted change is estimated by calculating the change in log-odds for each school district and translating 
this change into a predicted change in share voting yes based on the actual share voting yes for proposition 26 in the 
school district. 
18 The actual increase in the percent voting yes of 4.3 percentage points is based on the sample of unified school 
districts and thus differs from the statewide increas  in the percent voting yes which was 4.5 percentag  points.  
 16
 Table 3 presents the results of our “Horse Races” b tween the median income voter for a 
majority voting rule and alternative income percentil s.  The first two columns present coefficient 
estimates and standard errors for the change in income between the 50th and 45th percentile and the change 
in income between two other percentiles that are separated by 5 percentage points.  As those columns 
reveal, the income differences between the 40th to 35th percentiles and the 35th to 30th percentiles clearly 
dominate the income difference between the 50th and 45th percentiles.  Thus, our results provide evidence 
against the hypothesis that the median income voter is decisive in majority rule referenda.    
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 present coeffici nt estimates comparing the 40th to 35th 
percentile change to other percentile income differences.19  The income difference between 40th to 35th 
percentile clearly dominates all other percentile income differences except for the 35th to 30th, and as in 
column 1, the effect size for 40th to 35th is a little bigger than the effect size for 35th to 30th.  We interpret 
these results as implying that our data are consistent with a decisive voter near the 40th income percentile 
for a majority voting rule.  When we re-estimate thfour specifications presented in Table 2 using the 
change in income between the 40th and 35th percentiles rather than the 50th and 45th percentiles, we obtain 
coefficient estimates on the change in the decisive vot r’s income that range between 1.89 and 2.87 (see 
Table 6 below).  These point estimates imply that te change in the decisive voter’s income is consistent 
with between a 2.1 and a 3.2 percentage point increase in the percent voting yes between the two 
referenda.  Thus, based on the difference between the 40th and 35th percentile incomes, our model predicts 
that between 49% and 74% of the change in vote share  between the two propositions can be explained by 
the change in the decisive voter’s income. 
 
{Insert Table 3 Here} 
 
Our empirical identification of the 40th income percentile as decisive under majority rule is 
consistent with the earlier findings by Epple and Romano (1996a) and Fletcher and Kenny (2008) that the 
decisive voter is below the median income.  To explicitly test Epple and Romano’s “Ends against the 
Middle” hypothesis, we used data from the special school district tabulations of the 2000 Census to 
calculate the fraction of high income households (incomes above $75,000) in each district that are likely 
to have low demand for public education spending.  We focus on three groups of households: (1) 
household without children, (2) households age 55 or older, and (3) households with children in private 
school.  We then used our data on the fraction of high-income/low-demand households to split our sample 
into two equally sized subsamples.  The first subsample contains districts in which the fraction of hig -
                                                
19 We focus on the 40th to 35th percentile change (rather than the 35th to 30th) since the coefficient estimate on the 
income difference between the 40th and 35th percentiles reported in column 1 is slightly larger than the coefficient 
estimate for the 35th to 30th percentile. 
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income/low-demand households is above the sample median and the second subsample contains districts 
in which the fraction of high-income/low-demand households is below the sample median.  Thus, the first 
subsample corresponds to districts with a large fraction of high-income/low-demand households, while 
the second subsample corresponds to districts with a low fraction of high-income/low-demand 
households.  We then estimated separate regressions, milar to the “horse race” regressions reported in 
Table 3, for each of the two samples. 
The results of that exercise are reported in Table 4 with the results based on subsamples of high-
income households without children shown in column 1, high-income households age 55 or older shown 
in column 2, and high-income households with children in private school shown in column 3..  The first 
panel contains estimates using income percentile ranges that are 5 percent above and below the 
percentiles range of 40th to 35th selected in Table 3 (i.e. the 45th to 40th and the 35th to 30th income 
percentiles).  The second panel contains estimates using income percentiles 5 percent above and below 
the percentile range of 35th to 30th, which in Table 3 yielded results that were statisically 
indistinguishable from the 40th to 35th percentile, and finally the third panel directly examines the horse 
race comparison between the 40th to 35th and 35th to 30th income percentiles.   The first row in each panel 
contains estimates for the subsample that contains school districts that have a fraction of high-
income/low-demand households that is above the median for all school districts, while the second row 
contains estimates for the below the median subsample.  We hypothesize that the income percentile of the 
decisive voter should fall for the subsample of districts with a large fraction of high-income/low demand 
households because these are the households expected to vote with the poor against increased spending, 
and similarly the income percentile should rise for the below median subsample. 
The strongest results arise for the subsamples based on high-income households without children.  
In the first panel, the lower income percentile wins the “horse race” for the above median subsample and 
the high income percentile wins for the below median subsample, with the estimate for the “winning” 
percentile being statistically significant and the losing percentile being quite small.  In the next two 
panels, the higher income percentile wins the “horserace” for the below median subsample, but for the 
above median subsample our estimates are simply too imprecise to make comparisons.  Thus, for the 
subsamples based on high-income households without c ildren, we have evidence in all three panels of a 
higher percentile decisive voter when there are fewer high-income/low-demand households and some 
evidence of a lower percentile decisive voter when there are more high-income/low-demand households.  
Statistical imprecision is a more substantial problem for the second two subsamples.  Nonetheless, in 
panel 2, both columns 2 and 3 provide evidence of a higher income percentile decisive voter for below 
median subsamples.  Furthermore, in panel 3, the private school subsamples provide evidence of both a 
higher income percentile decisive voter for the below median subsample and a lower income percentile 
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decisive voter for the above median subsample.  All statistically significant estimates are consistent with 
the “Ends against the Middle” story.  
 
{Insert Table 4 Here} 
 
While our referenda model holds for any decisive voter, it is important to acknowledge that the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients change wh n the results are not consistent with the median 
voter model.  Following the logic of Epple and Romano, high income households with low demand for 
public education spending vote with the poor against levels of public spending that would be supported 
by the median income voter.  If high income households who do not use public education have no 
demand for public services, these households simply fall at the bottom of the distribution shifting the 
income percentile of the decisive voter downwards.  On the other hand, if these high income households 
have some demand for public education, potentially due to its impact on community environment or 
property values, these households will be spread across the bottom of the income distribution.  For 
example, since we find that the decisive voter under majority rule is at the 40th income percentile, the 
change in voting requirements from 50 to 55 percent likely shifts the decisive voter to a percentile 
between the 40th and 35th rather than to the 35th.  This occurs because the change in public spending 
preferred by an additional 5 percent of poor voters would also likely capture the votes of some rich 
households with low demand, thus delivering more than the additional 5 percent required to pass the 
measure under the 55 percent voting rule.  Therefore, our estimates likely overstate the change in the 
decisive voter’s income arising from the rule change between the two referenda, and understate the 
impact of income changes on referenda voting and public service demand.   
 
Heterogeneous Preference Distributions with Constant Elasticity of Demand 
Nonlinear least squares results for the change in vote share using the constant elasticity of 
demand specification with heterogeneous preference distributions outlined in equation (11) are presented 
in Table 5.  Similar to Table 2, the first column presents the basic model that controls only for the c ange 
in the income of the decisive voter.  The second, third, and fourth columns contain additively separable 
terms intended to control for differences in voting patterns between the two referenda including basic 
controls for turnout, jurisdiction size fixed effects, and additional controls for district demographic 
attributes.  In Table 5, the estimated income elasticities lie between 0.706 and 1.034, and are comparable 
to income elasticity estimates based on actual education capital spending in California of between 0.70 
and 0.77 (Balsdon, Brunner and Rueben, 2003).  The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the results of 
various non-nested hypothesis tests based on the null hypothesis that the “correct” model is either the one 
based on the 50th and 45th income percentile difference or the 40th and 35th income percentile difference.  
 19
These non-nested hypothesis tests are constructed using the P test developed by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981, 1982).  Note that in all four specifications, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
“correct” model is the one that includes the 50th versus 45th percentile income difference and fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that the “correct” model is theone that includes the 40th versus 35th percentile income 
difference.20   
The estimated coefficients on the variables we use to control for preference heterogeneity are 
generally negative and in many cases statistically significant.  Specifically, the estimated coefficients on 
the income inequality Gini index and the party affiliat on index are negative in all four specifications and, 
with the exception of the estimated coefficient on the party affiliation index in column 3, statistically 
significant for the specifications reported in columns 1 through 3.  In column 4, which includes district 
level control variables, these variables remain negative, but decrease in magnitude somewhat and lose 
significance.  In the fourth model, the coefficient o  racial heterogeneity is negative and statistically 
significant.  The negative sign on our preference heterogeneity controls is consistent with greater 
heterogeneity in income, political ideology, and/or racial heterogeneity leading to larger heterogeneity in 
preferences or greater variance in the unobservables that shape voting behavior as captured by β  in 
equation 7.  Specifically, our results suggest thate influence of the decisive voter’s demand on the 
determination of voting rules is smaller in more heterogeneous districts.  That finding is consistent with 
the theoretical implications of Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and empirical results of Romer, 
Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and Gerber and Lewis (2004) that public spending and politician’s 
behavior, respectively, follow the median voter’s preferences more closely in more homogenous 
jurisdictions.   
 
{Insert Table 5 Here} 
 
To put our results into context, we can use the results reported in Table 5 to examine how a one 
standard deviation increase in the preference heterogeneity term in equation (11), )exp(
^
Zφ , scales the 
influence of the decisive voter’s demand on the change in vote log-odds.  Evaluated at the mean of 
)exp(
^
Zφ , a one standard deviation increase in the standard deviation of preferences leads to a 21.1% 
decrease in the contribution of the median voter’s p eferences to the log odds of voting yes in model 1, 
and a 15.6%, 21.1%, and 12.8% decrease in models 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  In terms of the second 
                                                
20 All results presented in the preceding paragraph arise in simple constant elasticity demand models that do not 
allow for heterogeneous distributions of preferences across districts.  Subsample analyses similar to those presented 
in Table 4 were also estimated for constant elasticity demand models and finding are very similar to th se presented 
in Table 4, consistently supporting the “Ends against the Middle” story. 
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referenda, a one standard deviation increase in heterogeneity in all school districts would have decreased 
predicted support for the referenda by 5.0 percentage points in model 1, and by 4.7, 3.8, and 5.3 
percentage points in models 2, 3, and 4, respectively.21  Given that the actual percent yes in the second 
referenda was 54.4%, these predicted declines in support suggest that the referenda would have been 
defeated in models and 1, 2 and 4 and passed by a margin of only 1 percentage point in model 3.   
 
Tax Price Models 
As discussed in the data section, we observe both a tax price based on self-reported housing 
prices and a Gini index of how long households have lived in their housing units.  We expect that the tax 
price variable will accurately capture the tax price for jurisdictions homogeneous in terms of time a 
current residence, those with a Gini near zero.  To inc rporate tax price into our model that assumes a 
linear form for public service demand, we expand equation (9) by including the difference between the 
40th and 35th percentile tax price, the Gini index of homeownership tenure length, and the Gini index 
interacted with the tax price difference variable.  The coefficient on the tax price difference variable itself  
is expected to be negative since public service demand falls with tax price.   
To incorporate tax price into our model that assumes heterogeneous preference distributions and 
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where p is the tax price, δ  is price elasticity of public service demand, Rg  is the length of residence 
Gini, and γ allows the estimated parameter on price to differ from the price elasticity when jurisdictions 
are heterogeneous in terms of length of time in current residence.  
 Results based on our models that include tax price are shown in Table 6.  Specifically, results 
based on the linear demand model are presented in columns 1-3, while results based on the heterogeneous 
preference distribution model are presented in columns 4-6.  For both models, we present the basic 
estimates with just decisive voter’s income (using the 40th percentile as the decisive voter for a majority 
rule) in columns 1 and 4.  In columns 2 and 5, we present results based on models that also include 
controls for the 40th and 35th percentile tax price,22 and finally in columns 3 and 6 we allow the effect of 
tax price to vary with jurisdiction heterogeneity in t me in residence.  Results are presented in four panels 
                                                
21 The predicted change is estimated by calculating the change in log-odds for each school district for a ne standard 
deviation change in the heterogeneity index and translating this change into a predicted change in share voting yes 
based on the actual share voting yes for proposition 39 in the school district. 
22 We get very similar results if we use the median and 45th percentile tax price. 
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– one for each of the four sets of linear controls f und in Table 2.  In columns 2 and 4, the estimated 
coefficients on the tax price variable are typically of the wrong sign and statistically insignificant.  As 
discussed previously, this result is not surprising given that our measure of tax price most likely suffers 
from substantial measurement error due to the unique rules for property assessment in California.  
However, when we add the interaction with the time n residence Gini (columns 3 and 6), we find a 
negative relationship between support for the referenda and tax price as predicted by theory.  While noisy, 
the price elasticity estimates are comparable in magnitude to the existing literature, which has often 
produced at best only noisy and wide ranging estimates of price elasticity (Ross and Yinger, 1999).  Most 
importantly, our income estimates remain statistically significant and are fairly stable in magnitude across 
these models. 
 
{Insert Table 6 Here} 
 
9.  Counterfactuals 
 In order to further test whether we have truly identified a relationship between changes in the 
decisive voter’s income, we conduct two counterfactu ls.  The logic behind our counterfactuals is simple:  
if the relationship we have identified is truly caus l, then it should hold for school districts (which would 
have been directly affected by the outcomes of Propositions 26 and 39) but it should not hold for other 
political or geographic entities.  For example, while we expect the income difference between the 45th and 
35th percentile voter in a school district to explain differences in vote shares within school districts we 
would not expect the income difference between the 40th and 35th percentile voter in a census tract or a 
state assembly district to explain differences in vote shares within those geographic/political entities.  
That is, for political/geographic entities other than school districts, the income difference between th  40th 
and 35th percentile voter should be uncorrelated with changes in vote shares.   
 Our rationale for choosing census tracts and State Ass mbly Districts (SAD) is based on their size 
and their lack of relevance for the provision of any local public services.  Census tracts tend to be much 
smaller than many school districts while state assembly districts are much larger than census tracts and 
often contain many school districts. While some school districts such as Los Angeles Unified contain 
many SAD’s, California contains a total of 80 SAD’s relative to approximately 1,000 school districts.  
Thus, our counterfactuals cover geographic/political entities that are both smaller and larger than school 
districts on average.  Further, since neither of these geographic regions represents a level of local 
government, the decisive voter income variables should not be related to any unexpected fiscal 
implications of Propositions 26 and 39. 
 To implement our counterfactuals we estimate models identical to those reported in Table 2, 
except that we use the income 40th and 35th income percentiles, and calculate those percentiles for either 
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census tracts or state assembly districts.  For example, our counterfactual involving census tracts utilizes 
information for 6,840 census tracts on vote shares in a census tract, income differences between the 40th 
and 35th percentile voter in a census tract, etc.  Similarly, our counterfactual involving state assembly 
districts utilizes information for the 80 SAD’s in California on vote shares within SAD’s, income 
percentiles within SAD’s, etc.23  In addition, we also present estimates for census tract models that 
include district fixed effects.  District fixed effcts are included to insulate the estimates against the 
systematic across district variation that drives the estimates in the school district sample.24  Naturally, the 
school district fixed effects could also contaminate our SAD estimates (in fact some mid-sized school 
districts essentially are SAD’s), but a natural analog to the census tract fixed effects model does not exist 
because some SAD’s contain many school districts while others are entirely contained within school 
districts.   
Results for the counterfactuals are reported in Table 7.  In the interest of brevity, we report only 
the estimated coefficients on the income difference variable.  The first column of Table 7 replicates he
school district results reported in column 1 of Table 6.  The second, third and fourth columns present our 
counterfactuals based on state assembly districts, census tracts and a census tract model with district fixed 
effects, respectively.  The four panels presented in Table 7 correspond to the four models listed in Table 
2.  The results reported in Table 7 are quite striking.  In all our counterfactuals the estimated coeffici nts 
on the difference between the 40th and 35th percentile income are significantly smaller than the estimates 
for school districts with the exception of one model for the State Assembly Districts, where the estima e 
is very noisy.  Furthermore, all the estimated coeffici nts on the difference between the 40th and 35th 
percentile income in our counterfactuals are statistically insignificant.  Thus, the results reported in Table 
7 give us increased confidence that our results are c pturing a relationship between changes in the 
proposed decisive voter’s income and voting patterns that is unique to school districts. 
 
{Insert Table 7 Here}  
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper provides a direct test of the political economy “as if” proposition that underlies nearly 
all empirical studies that utilize the median voter model.  Specifically, we employ a unique dataset to 
examine whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending referenda.  Previous tests 
of the median voter model have typically relied on aggregate cross sectional data to examine whether the 
voter with the median income is pivotal.  These studies are likely biased because communities differ 
                                                
23 Similar results arise using the difference between th  50th and 45th percentile incomes. 
24 Standard errors for this model are also clustered at the school district level because heteroscedasticity can bias the 
estimation of standard errors in fixed effect models. 
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across a variety of unobservable dimensions that are likely correlated with the distribution of income in a 
community.  In contrast to previous studies, we make use of a unique natural experiment that allows us to 
estimate a first difference specification that contr ls for jurisdiction unobservables and avoids the 
fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by voters.  Consequently, we are able to 
avoid many of the problems that have hindered prior studies that have tested the median voter hypothesis.   
Our empirical results suggest that voters understand he impact of changes in the identity of the 
decisive voter and rationally consider the impact of voting rules on local spending when voting on 
referenda that determine voting rules.  However, ou results strongly suggest that even under majority rule 
voting, the voter with the median income is not decisive.  Rather, our results are consistent with a decisive 
voter at the 40th percentile income for majority voting.  That findig is consistent with an “Ends against 
the Middle” story where the income percentile of the decisive voter lies below the median income for a 
majority voting rule because low demand, high income individuals vote with the poor against public 
spending.  Further, we directly test the “Ends against the Middle” hypothesis by splitting the sample 
between jurisdictions that contain more or less low demand, high income households, and all our findings 
support the hypothesis. 
 The magnitudes of our findings also appear to be quite reasonable and are consistent with 
previous literature.  For example, our results suggest that the implied change in the decisive voter’s 
income is consistent with between a 2.1 and 3.2 percentage point increase in the percent voting yes du to 
the change in the vote requirement from 50 to 55 percent, while the actual increase in percent voting yes 
was 4.3 percentage points.  Further, constant elasticity of demand models provide estimated income 
elasticities of between 0.706 and 1.034, which are stable across specifications and consistent with the 
existing literature.  In our model with tax price, our price elasticity estimates are noisier, but again 
reasonable, falling between -0.707 and -1.764.  Finally, the estimated effect of median income on voting 
is not present in counterfactuals estimated at the census tract and state assembly district level.   
In our constant elasticity of demand models with heterogeneous preference distributions we 
consistently find that school district income heterogeneity is associated with reduced influence of the 
decisive voter’s preferences on support for the refrenda, a result consistent with Gerber and Lewis’s 
(2004) analysis of politician’s behavior.  In terms of magnitude, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in heterogeneity among all school district would have reduced support for the second referenda 
(which passed by 4.4 percentage points) by between 5.3 and 3.8 percentage points.  Earlier work by 
Romer, Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and Rothstein (1994) conclude that the decisive voter’s preferences 
should have less influence on support for referenda i  more heterogeneous jurisdictions, and our findings 
provide strong support for the implications of their theoretical models.  Recent empirical work by 
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and Alesina, Baqir nd Hoxby (2004) find that heterogeneous 
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communities spend less on productive public goods an  that jurisdiction consolidation is reduced when 
the surrounding region is heterogeneous, respectively.  Our model along with the earlier work of Romer, 
Rosenthal and Munley (1992) and Rothstein (1994) ident fies another important mechanism by which 
heterogeneity influences public choice concerning the provision of local public goods.  Referenda models 
of this sort clearly imply that heterogeneity in preferences within a jurisdiction will reduce electoral 
support for both referenda’s that authorize spending o  public services, as well as referenda’s intended to 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Difference Variables
Fraction Yes 0.477 0.085 0.505 0.084
Income 47,421 17,286 42,835 15,806
Turnout 0.279 0.098 0.431 0.122
Fraction Republican 0.373 0.114 0.374 0.114
Fraction Democrat 0.441 0.108 0.436 0.106
Tax Price 0.532 0.291 0.504 0.279
Level Variables Mean St. Dev.
Fraction College Educated 0.224 0.150
Fraction Homeowner 0.634 0.109
Fraction H.H. White 0.640 0.217
Fraction H.H. with Children 0.381 0.096
Fraction Age 65 or Older 0.115 0.046
Gini Index for Years in Current Residence 0.453 0.028
Gini Index of Income Inequality 0.423 0.039
Herfindahl for Party Affiliation 0.646 0.051
Herfindahl for Race/Ethnicity 0.489 0.147
Proposition 26 Proposition 39
Notes :  Table contains means and standard deviations in the sample of unified school districts in California for the two 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decisive Voter Income ($10,000's) 0.188** 0.232** 0.143** 0.203**
(0.051) (0.064) (0.058) (0.090)
Turnout 0.220 0.182 0.120
(0.160) (0.154) (0.154)
Fraction Democrat -0.804* -0.404 -0.208
(0.467) (0.367) (0.373)
Fraction Republican 0.052 -0.022 -0.207
(0.491) (0.446) (0.492)
Second Quantile of Size 0.019 0.019
(0.023) (0.022)
Third Quantile of Size 0.085*** 0.081**
(0.021) (0.021)
Fourth Quantile of Size 0.105** 0.094**
(0.021) (0.021)




Fraction H.H. White -0.065
(0.056)
Fraction H.H. with Children -0.297
(0.190)
Fraction Age 65 or Older -0.698**
(0.223)
R-Square 306 306 306 306
Observations 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.21
Notes:  Columns 1-4 contain OLS parameter estimates for the change in log odds of share voting yes between th two 
referenda.  The rows denoted by decisive voter income, turnout, fraction democrat, and fraction republican contain estimates 
on the change in those variables between the two referenda while the next eight rows contain estimates on the district size fixed 
effects and school district demographic attributes.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance 




Coefficient Estimates: “Horse Race” Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentile Coefficient St. Error Percentile Coefficient St. Error
50th - 45th 0.123 (0.113) 40th - 35th 0.265** (0.104)
65th - 60th 0.099 (0.072) 55
th - 50th 0.044 (0.083)
50th - 45th 0.162 (0.111) 40th - 35th 0.246** (0.106)
60th - 55th 0.060 (0.081) 50
th - 45th 0.072 (0.102)
50th - 45th 0.176 (0.133) 40th - 35th 0.255** (0.115)
55th - 50th 0.037 (0.112) 45
th - 40th 0.047 (0.117)
50th - 45th 0.111 (0.153) 40th - 35th 0.169 (0.120)
45th - 40th 0.123 (0.157) 35
th - 30th 0.166 (0.121)
50th - 45th 0.072 (0.102) 40th - 35th 0.224** (0.108)
40th - 35th 0.246** (0.106) 30
th - 25th 0.114 (0.114)
50th - 45th 0.069 (0.103) 40th - 35th 0.208** (0.101)
35th - 30th 0.240** (0.105) 25
th - 20th 0.149 (0.099)
50th - 45th 0.123 (0.098) 40th - 35th 0.287** (0.107)
30th - 25th 0.175 (0.108) 20
th - 15th 0.001 (0.096)
Notes:   Columns 1-2 contain OLS estimates, based on model 4 of Table 2, for various "horse races" between 
the difference in the 50th and 45th percentiles incomes and various other income percentile differences.   
Columns 3-4 contain OLS estimates for various "horse races" between the difference in the 40th and 35th
percentiles incomes and various other income percentile differences.  Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Coefficient Estimates: “Ends Against Middle” Regressions 
 
 
Percentile Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error
Above Median 45th - 40th -0.017 (0.090) 0.008 (0.109) 0.052 (0.111)
35th - 30th 0.244** (0.110) 0.161 (0.127) 0.204 (0.133)
Below Median 45th - 40th 0.609** (0.201) 0.178 (0.230) 0.324 (0.204)
35th - 30th 0.138 (0.181) 0.314 (0.199) 0.238 (0.163)
Above Median 40th - 35th 0.128 (0.106) 0.115 (0.105) 0.021 (0.121)
30th - 25th 0.109 (0.147) 0.078 (0.150) 0.228 (0.149)
Below Median 40th - 35th 0.710** (0.229) 0.461* (0.251) 0.531** (0.220)
30th - 25th -0.070 (0.186) 0.033 (0.198) -0.067 (0.165)
Above Median 40th - 35th 0.046 (0.116) 0.081 (0.117) -0.043 (0.133)
35th - 30th 0.202 (0.126) 0.113 (0.134) 0.269* (0.145)
Below Median 40th - 35th 0.698** (0.233) 0.375 (0.285) 0.460* (0.244)
35th - 30th -0.038 (0.191) 0.146 (0.241) 0.060 (0.194)
Notes:   Columns 1-3 contain OLS estimates, based on model 4 of Table 2, for various "horse races" between different income percentile differences.  
Rows denoted Above Median correspond to the subsample of districts with high concentrations of high-income/low-demand households, while rows 
denoted Below Median correspond to the subsample of districts with low concentrations of high-income/low-demand households.  Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3)









Coefficient Estimates: Constant Elasticity of Demand with Preference Heterogeneity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income 1.005** 0.997** 1.034** 0.706**
(0.175) (0.152) (0.221) (0.221)
Turnout 0.288** 0.250* 0.168
(0.145) (0.141) (0.158)
Fraction Democrat -0.714* -0.451 -0.377
(0.426) (0.346) (0.350)
Fraction Republican 0.097 0.135 0.106
(0.485) (0.456) (0.465)
Second Quantile of Size 0.010 0.012
(0.023) (0.021)
Third Quantile of Size 0.076** 0.078**
(0.021) (0.021)
Fourth Quantile of Size 0.103** 0.102**
(0.022) (0.022)




Fraction H.H. White 0.002
(0.055)
Fraction H.H. with Children -0.021
(0.131)
Fraction Age 55 or Older -0.363
(0.248)
Preference Heterogeneity Parameters
Gini Index of Income Inequality -3.243** -2.774** -3.562** -2.195
(1.429) (1.153) (1.513) (1.348)
Party Affiliation Index -2.848** -2.065* -2.304 -1.099
(1.325) (1.092) (1.456) (1.255)
Racial Index 0.513 0.267 -0.771 -0.610*
(0.407) (0.354) (0.499) (0.349)
P Test p-value p-value p-value p-value
H0: 50
th - 45th 0.027** 0.013**  0.017** 0.017 **
H0: 40
th - 35th 0.759 0.489 0.986  0.104 
Notes:  Table presents the estimates from the constant elasticity of demand model with preference heterogeneity shown in 
equation (11).  The estimates presented in the first row under income represents elasticity while the other estimates are 
coefficients on the variables in a standard linear specification.  The bottom panel of the table shows the results of non-nested p-
tests based on the null hypothesis that the "correct" model is the model that includes the income percentile difference listed 
after H0:.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by 







 Table 6 
Coefficient Estimates from Regressions that Include Tax Price 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income 0.226** 0.219** 0.179** 1.005** 0.840** 0.775**
(0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.175) (0.185) (0.184)
Model 1 Tax Price 0.004 -0.003 0.390** -0.779**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.142) (0.220)
Tax Price*Tenure Gini 0.037 2.734**
(0.028) (0.583)
Income 0.279** 0.282** 0.234** 0.997** 0.883** 0.855**
(0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.152) (0.147) (0.159)
Model 2 Tax Price -0.002 -0.041** 0.219** -1.764**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.110) (0.675)
Tax Price*Tenure Gini 0.117** 4.627**
(0.037) (1.607)
Income 0.189** 0.188** 0.174** 1.034** 0.929** 0.880**
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.221) (0.202) (0.200)
Model 3 Tax Price 0.000 -0.035** 0.197 -1.404**
(0.005) (0.014) (0.140) (0.671)
Tax Price*Tenure Gini 0.097** 3.835**
(0.037) (1.648)
Income 0.287** 0.289** 0.270** 0.706** 0.644** 0.567**
(0.091) (0.091) (0.100) (0.221) (0.186) (0.177)
Model 4 Tax Price 0.002 -0.038** 0.094 -0.707
(0.005) (0.015) (0.081) (0.410)*
Tax Price*Tenure Gini 0.112** 2.015*
(0.039) (1.043)
Notes:  Table presents parameter estimates for models that also incude controls for tax price.  Columns 1-3 show estimates for the linear model while 
columns 4-6 show estimates for the constant elasticity of demand odel with preference heterogeneity.   The panels correspond to the models listed in 
Table 2 and all models contain the same control variables listed in Table 2.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical significance 
at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectively.




Coefficient Estimates from Counterfactuals 
 
 





Census Tracts with 
District Fixed Effects
Income 0.226** 0.013 -0.008 -0.020*
Model 1 (0.056) (0.090) (0.019) (0.012)
Observations 306 80 6891 6891
Income 0.279** 0.052 0.013 -0.009
Model 2 (0.069) (0.085) (0.017) (0.009)
Observations 306 80 6891 6891
Income 0.189** 0.088 0.014 -0.008
Model 3 (0.064) (0.091) (0.017) (0.009)
Observations 306 80 6891 6891
Income 0.287** 0.308 0.030 -0.017
Model 4 (0.091) (0.352) (0.019) (0.014)
Observations 306 80 6891 6891
Notes:  Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 present O.L.S. coefficient estimates for the difference between the 40th and 35th percentile 
income for the sample of school districts, State Assembly districts and Census tracts, respectively. The panels correspond to the 
models listed in Table 2 and all models contain the same control variables listed in Table 2.  Robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses, and statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level are denoted by * and **, respectiv ly.  
